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Insurers and Personal Injury Litigation: 
Acknowledging the Elephant in the Living Room 
RICHARD LEWIS 1 
Professor, Cardiff Law School, Cardiff University 
Abstract 
There is a debate among academics about the extent that insurance has influenced the 
law of tort. On the one hand it has been suggested that insurance has been no more 
than a ‘makeweight’ argument in the development of tort liability. On the other hand, 
others have claimed that insurance has had a substantial effect, even if this is often 
hidden or, like the elephant in the living room, not discussed openly. This article lends 
support to one side of this debate by describing the enormous importance of insurers 
to personal injury litigation. It argues that all cases, in their wider context, have been 
affected by the practices of insurance companies. This is the case even though 
insurance is rarely mentioned by judges and largely ignored by tort textbooks. Insurers 
provide the lifeblood of the tort system. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
This article summarises the structural importance of insurers to the system of 
compensation for personal injury. How many defendants are insured, and how many 
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insurers are there? How have they affected the scope of the tort system and the role of 
courts and judges? What has been their influence upon whether, when, and for how 
much cases are settled? How may they affect legislation on the law of tort? 
The article is part of a much wider study of the relationship between the rules of 
tort law, on the one hand, and the availability of insurance, on the other.2 It has been 
argued that judges appear more ready to impose liability when insurance enables the 
cost of compensation to be more widely distributed.3 Tort rules have been said to have 
been developed in favour of claimants, at least in situations where they have been less 
able to protect themselves by taking out their own first party insurance. Other 
academics have denied that there is any consistent pattern in the law which reflects 
such a close relationship with insurance.4 However, here it is argued that the overall 
influence of insurers upon the system makes it difficult to view any tort case in 
isolation: each and every case is affected, no matter whether determined in court or 
out of it. The detailed rules of tort are not examined here.5 Instead we concentrate 
upon the institutional context within which tort law is practised and insurance 
functions. How important are insurers to the litigation system and in what ways do 
they influence it? 
The Real Defendants and Paymasters 
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Last year there were 770,000 claims brought for personal injury – one for every 76 
people in the UK.6 Although this was a record number, the overall trend showed that 
the rate of claim in fact had decreased.7 The majority of claims are brought against 
defendants who are individual people, but they are almost all insured. In nine out of 
ten cases the real defendants are insurance companies, with the remainder comprising 
large self-insured organisations or public bodies. It is extremely rare indeed for an 
uninsured individual to be the real defendant. Instead policyholders cede control over 
their case to their insurer and thereafter usually play little or no part in the litigation 
process.8 Insurers determine how the defence is to be conducted and, for example, 
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commonly make admissions without the consent of the insured,9 and settle cases in 
spite of the policyholder’s objection.10 
Insurers are the paymasters of the tort system, being responsible for 94 per cent of 
tort compensation for personal injury. 11 They process the routine payments and they 
decide which elements of damage they will accept or contest. It is unusual for them to 
contest liability, one recent study revealing that insurers’ files “contained remarkably 
little discussion of liability,” finding it initially denied in only 20 per cent of cases. 12 
As a result, eventually insurers make at least some payment in the great majority of 
personal injury claims.13 Tort thus provides a structure for processing mass payments 
of small amounts of compensation; only very rarely does it stage a gladiatorial contest 
to determine whether a particular defendant was in the wrong. Issues relating to the 
existence of a duty of care, causation of damage, and even breach of duty are generally 
not relevant. 
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In the great majority of cases insurers pay not only compensation to claimants, but 
also the litigation costs of both sides. However, if an action fails the claimant may 
become liable for costs. To avoid this, after their injury, claimants may be offered by 
loss insurers a policy which promises to pay their costs in the event of an unsuccessful 
claim. If the claim proves successful, the premium can be added to the damages 
awarded in tort. Insurers may also offer such legal expenses insurance in other 
contexts. For example, it is estimated that around 17 million motor policies and 15 
million household policies offer ‘before the event’ legal expenses insurance. The 
result is that legal expenses insurers now control litigation in 80 per cent of motor 
accident claims, and their market penetration is expected to continue to increase.14 
Legal expenses insurance can affect key aspects of the litigation.15 In particular, 
claimants cannot easily choose their own lawyer and may be required to use one from 
a panel approved by the insurer.16 As a result it is estimated that soon almost all road 
accident cases will be dealt with by no more than a hundred of the 9,000 solicitors’ 
firms nationwide.17 The clients of these solicitors may receive a different service 
compared to those claimants free to choose their own lawyer: conflicts of interest are 
more likely to arise.18 Insurers thus fund the tort system, control much of the 
representation, and can have an interest in whatever the outcome of a claim. 
Bureaucratic Organisation 
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Classic empirical studies reveal that, in practice, the rules of tort law are much less 
important than textbooks might lead one to suppose: it is insurance bureaucracy that 
dictates much litigation procedure, and determines whether, when, and for how much, 
claims are settled.19 The important centres of personal injury practice are insurers’ 
buildings, rather than courts of law, or even solicitors' offices.20 The number of such 
insurance centres has declined recently because of company mergers and greater 
specialisation. The work has been concentrated in particular localities. Consolidation 
in the general liability market has resulted in it being dominated by only eight major 
companies, although there are more than fifty other smaller firms issuing policies.21 
For motor insurance there were over 350 companies authorised to transact motor 
insurance in 2002, but only 65 companies and 11 Lloyds syndicates actively did so. 
The ten largest motor insurers controlled two thirds of the market.22 The three quarters 
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of a million claimants suffering personal injury last year therefore came up against 
only a few handfuls of real defendants. 
In dealing with claims, insurers have developed highly systematised approaches 
which make extensive use of information technology. Their standard procedures have 
been refined further for the “fast track” cases involving smaller amounts of money. 
They closely monitor the performance of not only their in-house claims handlers but 
also the lawyers they choose to instruct. Striving for efficiency, they have reduced the 
number of solicitors’ firms acting for them. Economic pressures mean that 
communication between the parties takes place on the telephone rather than via letters 
or face to face meetings, and the outcome of a claim is likely to be influenced as much 
by an impersonal computerised assessment as by the discretion of the claims handler 
involved.23 Although these generalisations about how litigation is conducted do not 
apply to all insurers for every type of case,24 they have a great effect upon the way in 
which tort rules are viewed and used in practice. 
Trials, Settlements and Tactics 
Insurers determine the extent that lawyers become involved in disputes, and the 
tactics that are used in the proceedings. Increasingly cases are being settled at an early 
stage, and without resort to the issue of court documents,25 or even to defence 
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lawyers.26 Insurers decide, in particular, whether a case merits the very exceptional 
treatment of being taken to a court hearing.27 In effect, they allow trial judges to 
determine only one per cent of all the claims made. Only a few of these are appealed 
with the result that the senior judiciary are left to adjudicate upon a small fraction of 
what are, by then, very untypical cases. Whether an appeal court is to be given an 
opportunity to examine a point of tort law may depend upon the insurer for, if it serves 
the insurer's purpose for doubt to remain, the claimant can be paid in full and 
threatened with a costs award if the action is continued.28 In this sense tort principles 
have been shaped by and for insurers, even though there has been a significant growth 
in the power and expertise of claimant lawyers in the last twenty years.29 (The 
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contribution of claimant lawyers to the personal injury system merits separate 
discussion and is not dealt with here). 
Insurers’ influence upon settlements is even more pronounced than it is upon 
decided cases. The lawyer asked by his client to advise on the merits of a claim is 
concerned with the realities of the litigation system rather than the formal rules of law. 
Practitioners would agree with the key analysis of Ross30 that the textbook rules of 
tort are often transformed when they come to be used in the system in three ways: 
firstly, they are simplified; secondly, they are made more liberal; and thirdly, they are 
made more inequitable. Simplification occurs because the rules are too uncertain 
when applied to the individual facts of particular accidents. For reasons of cost and 
administrative efficiency, insurers have been forced to substitute other criteria for the 
strict tort rules. Mechanical rules of thumb - such as the car running into the back of 
another always being found the one at fault - replace any detailed investigation into 
blame. There is neither the time nor resources to instruct experts to analyse the scene 
of each road accident and precisely measure its effect upon the individual claimant. 
Cases are disposed of on the basis of paperwork alone, and this may bear only a 
limited relationship to what actually occurred. The result of the cost pressures upon 
insurers is that many more claims succeed than the strict rules of tort would allow. 
Often insurers pay something for claims which, on full investigation, would be 
without foundation. As a result 
“… wherever there is insurance there is … a closer approximation to 
the objectives of social insurance in fact than the doctrines of tort law 
would lead one to suppose.”31 
However, this liberality is but part of a system which overall is weighted in favour 
of insurers and results in much inequality. Indeed the case often used to illustrate the 
                                                                                                                                            
founding of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers in 1990 and its subsequent activity reflects 
the increasing abilities and resources of claimant lawyers. Melville Williams, “A. P. I. L.” (1991) 19 
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 F. V. Harper and Fleming James, The Law of Torts (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1956) s 13.7. 
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general inequalities in the legal system involves a “one-shotter” accident victim suing 
a “repeat player” insurer.32 Delay, uncertainty, financial need and other pressures 
cause claimants to accept sums much lower than a judge would award. The eagerness 
of claimants and their solicitors to get something from the system is reflected in the 
fact that, in the past, they have been very keen to accept the first formal offer made to 
them by the “risk neutral” insurer.33 Those claimants who can withstand the pressures 
of litigation do better than those who cannot, with the result that those from a 
particular class or background are more likely to succeed.34 Those who suffer most are 
the severely injured. Although in the greatest need, they will find their high value 
claim scrutinised in detail and processed very differently from the average case which 
typically involves but a minor upset and little, if any, financial loss. Those seriously 
injured are much less likely to receive “full” compensation than those suffering minor 
injury,35 although they are left in a much better position than accident victims forced 
to rely upon state benefits alone. The great majority of claimants quickly recover from 
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their minor injury and, for a variety of reasons, are likely to emerge over-compensated 
for their economic loss.36 
The overall result of the settlement system is that rough and ready justice is 
dispensed, much influenced by the insurance company personnel and procedures, and 
driven by the needs of the insurance industry and the cost of the legal process. The 
system produces arbitrary results and bears only a limited relationship to the portrayal 
of justice contained in the traditional tort textbook. 
The Scope of the Personal Injury System 
The importance of insurers to the tort system is reflected in the fact that the claims 
which are brought closely match the areas where liability insurance is to be found. 
Thus road and work accidents predominate partly because those are the two major 
areas where tort insurance is compulsory.37 They constitute 86 per cent of all the 
claims brought for personal injury.38 They dominate the practice of tort even though 
they constitute a minority of all accidents, and are an even smaller percentage of the 
causes of all forms of disablement and incapacity for work.39 Where you get injured is 
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 D. Dewees, D. Duff, and M. Trebilcock, Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts 
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Tort Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) 63 - 66. 
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 The other miscellaneous areas of compulsory insurance and the lack of coherent policy behind them 
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Lottery (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 99. 
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the course of leisure activities or in playing sport, and yet very few of these resulted in any damages 
award. Although work and transport injuries dominate the tort system they comprise only about half 
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therefore all-important. Accidents in areas not covered by liability insurance are 
extremely unlikely to be compensated. According to one study, whereas 1 in 4 road 
accident victims and 1 in 10 work accident victims get something from tort, only 1 in 
67 injured elsewhere do so.40 
The scope of the tort system is affected not only by those areas where liability 
insurance has been made compulsory, but also by the existence of alternative sources 
of compensation. What opportunities are there for resort to either welfare payments 
from public insurance, or policy monies from first party private insurance? These may 
reduce the incentive to pursue a common law claim. The interrelationship of 
compensation systems cannot be discussed in detail here,41 but one example will 
suffice to demonstrate the potential effects of other insurance systems upon tort.42 The 
                                                                                                                                            
of all accidents according to Pearson op cit vol 2 table 57. In Australia they are less than a fifth 
according to H. Luntz and D. Hambly, Torts: Cases and Commentary (Sydney: Butterworths, 5th ed 
2002) 4. Datamonitor, UK Personal Injury Litigation 2003 at 79 estimate that there were 7.8 million 
accidents in the home in 1999 of which only 0.5 per cent potentially could result in a successful tort 
claim. 
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 The Pearson Commission op cit vol 1 table 5. The study reveals that only 6.5 per cent of all accident 
victims incapacitated for three days of more are compensated by the tort system. However, if only 
serious injuries are considered tort becomes much more important. Where an accident causes 
incapacity for work for six months or more, almost a third of victims receive tort damages. Harris et 
al op cit made similar findings concerning the limited importance of the tort system to accident 
victims in general. The significance of tort is reduced tenfold if account is taken of those suffering 
disablement not from accidents alone but from all causes, including congenital illness and disease. P. 
S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 100. 
41
 See Lewis, “Tort and Social Security” in U. Magnus (ed), The Impact of Social Security Law on Tort 
Law (Vienna: Springer, 2003). 
42
 A second example of the influence of insurance upon litigation involves damage to property rather 
than personal injury. Insurers have made private agreements with one another to abandon the tort 
system in respect of certain losses. These arrangements may take various forms, but the one which has 
come to public attention is the so called ‘knock for knock’ agreement in relation to motor accidents. 
These agreements are made in order to avoid the excessive cost and uncertainty that would be involved 
if insurers were forced to use the tort system for all small claims. They result from the inter-relationship 
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example is a historical one and, in practice, resulted in the abandonment of tort law 
for the great majority of work injuries. It derives from the ‘election’ rule whereby 
workers injured in the course of their employment had to choose either to sue in tort 
or to claim private insurance benefits on a no-fault basis from their employer. They 
could not do both by obtaining these insurance benefits and pursuing an action in tort. 
For a variety of reasons employees overwhelmingly opted, or were pressed into 
receiving the no-fault benefits,43 leaving the tort system with a very limited role to 
play in the industrial field.44 There was judicial criticism of the “deplorable” and 
“extremely shabby” tactics used by insurers to prevent tort claims being pursued.45 
Eventually the ‘employer privilege’ was abolished in 1948,46 and since that time tort 
claims for work accidents have flourished, now constituting over a third of all the 
actions brought.47 
Damages 
This influence of insurance upon the general pattern of tort liability is matched by 
its effect upon the level of compensation awarded. In the USA it is clear that 
individual damages awards have been affected by the policy limits set by insurers. 
There is evidence that lawyers do not pursue claims beyond these limits in order to 
                                                                                                                                            
of first party insurance with the tort system. Lewis, “Insurers’ Agreements not to Enforce their Strict 
Legal Rights” (1985) 48 Modern Law Rev 275. 
43
 W. A. Dinsdale, History of Accident Insurance in Great Britain (London: Stone and Cox, 1954) 161. 
44
 P. W. J. Bartrip, Workmen's Compensation in Twentieth Century Britain (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987) 
chap 10. 
45
 Deane v H. F. Edwards & Co (1941) 34 BWCC 183. 
46
 Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948. The privilege continues in North America, a few European 
countries, and increasingly in Australia. 
47
 Compensation Recovery Unit figures for 2003-04 and Datamonitor, UK Personal Injury Litigation 
2004 fig 5.  
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obtain “blood money” from defendants personally.48 However, in the UK the policy 
limits for a claim are almost never relevant,49 and therefore it is less easy to see the 
precise effect of insurance cover in the individual case. However, here it is argued that 
the principles upon which damages are assessed implicitly recognise that it is a 
company with a deep pocket that will pay and not an individual, and this is 
fundamental to the continued existence of the personal injury system. 
Although most awards in tort are for very limited sums - little more than £2,500 50 - 
there are very few individuals who could afford to pay the amounts required in serious 
injury cases. The justice of the case never merits an investigation into the limited 
means of the average person found liable because that person will not have to pay. It is 
clear that “the size of damages awards … is explicable only on the basis that judges 
are influenced by the widespread presence of insurance.”51 This is a major point. The 
possibility of awarding millions of pounds in damages all to be paid in one lump sum 
distinguishes tort from welfare and other compensation systems. Liability insurance 
enables tort to espouse its distinctive rhetoric: it purports to make an assessment of 
loss that is not only tailored to the individual claimant, but sufficient to restore the 
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position before injury took place. When set against the results achieved in practice 
these claims are greatly overstated,52 and yet they form much of the reason for tort’s 
existence. Without a mechanism to distribute the cost of imposing liability, it would 
rarely be worth assessing damages in the way we do at present in serious injury 
claims. Without insurance it is doubtful whether the tort system would survive at all.53 
Insurance, in this sense, provides the lifeblood of tort. 
In recent years major changes have been made to the assessment of damages, and 
many of these are predicated upon payment being made either by insurers or other 
large self-insured bodies. The assessment of damages has become ever more precise. 
Actuarial and forensic accountancy evidence has become commonplace. Such matters 
as the discount rate for early receipt of damages,54 the interest rate on delayed 
payment,55 and the inflation factor enabling past awards to be compared with those of 
the present day have all been more closely linked to the wider financial world. In a 
few serious injury cases lump sum payment has been replaced in part by a structured 
settlement, a reform prompted, manufactured and, until recently, controlled by 
insurers and insurance intermediaries.56 It is impossible to conceive of such 
developments - involving continuing lifetime obligations to make increasing payments 
- if it were not for the fact that individuals almost never pay tort damages themselves. 
                                                 
52
 Above note 35. 
53
 J. G. Fleming, The American Tort Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 21. 
54
 Law Commission, Structured Settlements and Interim and Provisional Damages (1994) Report No 
224. 
55
 Law Commission, Pre-Judgement Interest on Debts and Damages (2004) Report No 287. 
56
 Lewis, “Structured Settlements: An Emergent Study” (1994) 13 Civil J Q 18. R. Lewis, Structured 
Settlements: The Law and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) and I. Goldrein and M. de 
Haas (eds), Structured Settlements: A Practical Guide (London: Butterworths, 2nd ed 1997). Under 
the Courts Act 2003 s 100 courts now have power to order that damages take this periodic form even 
if insurers object. 
 16 
The argument here is that it is not easy to divorce these changing rules on assessment 
and payment of damages from the fact that it is insurers who run the tort system. 
Lobbying and Legislation 
One of the main reasons for insurers forming their own trade association in 1917 
was in order to respond to potential changes in the law.57 The Association of British 
Insurers (ABI) has since grown to such an extent that, with one exception, it is now 
more than twice the size of any other trade association.58 With an annual budget of 
over £20 million, it has been very effective in putting forward the industry’s point of 
view. Its lobbying of government ministries is such that one insurance commentator 
has even suggested that, internationally, institutions such as the ABI “see themselves 
as governing governments.”59 The ABI has also ensured that its case is heard in 
Parliament. Until 1997 one in ten M.P.s declared a financial link with the insurance 
industry,60 although this figure has been halved for the current Parliament.61  
The regulatory framework of insurance reflects the success of the ABI in arguing 
for forms of self-regulation in lieu of statutory controls, and for exemption from 
general legislation that might otherwise apply. The clearest example of this is the last 
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minute exemption of insurance policies from domestic legislation dealing with control 
of unfair contract terms, a result described by the former Director General of Fair 
Trading as “amazing.”62  Because of such influence, insurance remains the least 
regulated of contracts. 
The ABI is organised so as to respond to all government proposals to change the 
wide areas of law with which it is concerned, these extending far beyond the law of 
tort. In 1998 the government announced that no proposal for regulation which has an 
impact upon businesses would be considered by ministers without a “regulatory 
impact assessment” being carried out. Rather than being just another bureaucratic 
requirement, the new procedures offer business and industry a major opportunity to 
influence the policy and legislative process.63 Parliamentary Bills are now 
accompanied by impact statements assessing the financial costs and benefits of the 
measures being proposed. In drawing up such statements civil servants are directed to 
consult widely. Twenty or so bodies are specifically named, one of them being the 
ABI.64 As a result, it is automatic for the ABI to be asked to estimate the effect of 
proposed reforms on insurance premiums. Insurability is therefore now a relevant 
consideration whenever statutory changes affecting tort are being considered. 
Although these impact statements have given insurers a formal opportunity to make 
representations to government, it is doubtful whether this has increased their influence 
very much. This is because their most effective representations continue to be 
exercised in private, behind closed doors.65  
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One illustration of the effectiveness of such private lobbying is the overturning of a 
Law Commission recommendation that a particular financial formula be used to set 
the discount rate in assessing damages for personal injury. In the Damages Act 1996 
the Commission’s recommendation was replaced by a power given to the Lord 
Chancellor to change the rate as he saw fit. However, this discretionary power was not 
exercised for some time, and when a rate was eventually set it was less favourable to 
claimants than if the Commission’s formula had been used. The Opposition 
spokesman in Parliament noted that the change in the Act was “mightily convenient to 
the insurance industry” and commented that it was the result of “whispering in 
appropriate ears.”66 
Conclusion 
Most of the facts we have cited about insurers and personal injury litigation 
have been proven time and again. They derive from a series of empirical studies, each 
broadly confirming the general picture.67 However, tort textbooks pay them little, if 
any, attention.68 Insurers are the elephant in the living room of tort. In spite of students 
being left in ignorance, it cannot be denied that insurers are fundamental to the 
operation of the tort system. “Insurance ‘technology’ underlies the whole practice of 
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tort law.”69 Over fifty years ago the American scholar, Fleming James, concluded that 
the doctrines of tort law  
“… are horse and buggy rules in an age of machinery; and they might 
well have gone to the scrap heap some time ago had not the 
tremendous growth of liability insurance and the progressive ingenuity 
of the companies made it possible to get some of the benefits of social 
insurance under - or perhaps in spite of - the legal rules.”70 
 
Although many readers of this journal, in particular, will disagree with the suggestion 
that it has been the “progressive ingenuity” of insurers that has been responsible for 
increasing the scope of tort coverage, there can be no doubt that insurance profoundly 
influences the practical operation of the law of tort. It is not merely an ancillary device 
to protect the insured, but is the “primary medium for the payment of compensation, 
and tort law [is] a subsidiary part of the process.”71 Without insurance the tort system 
“would long ago have collapsed under the weight of the demands put on it and been 
replaced by an alternative, and perhaps more efficient system of accident 
compensation.”72 But that is another story.73 
                                                 
69
 J. Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 36. 
70
 “Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance” (1948) 57 Yale LJ 549 at 569. 
71
 P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law (London: Butterworths, 6th ed 1999) 191. 
72
 J. G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 9th ed 1998) 13. 
73
 Sugarman, “Personal Injury and Social Policy - Institutional and Ideological Alternatives” in N. 
Mullany and A. M. Linden (eds), Torts Tomorrow (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 1998). One 
alternative was given in S. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal Injury Law (New York: Quorum, 
1989), and another in T. Ison, Compensation Systems for Injury and Disease: The Policy Choices 
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1994). These solutions can be contrasted with one which relies upon first 
party insurance as the foundation for radical reform. See P. S. Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 1997). 
